In his book, Leviathan (1651), Hobbes puts forward an argument for a social contract – influenced to some degree by the English Civil War, he suggests that the only way to avoid chaos, civil war and bellum omnium contra omnes (“the war of all against all”) was for individuals to sacrifice some of their 'natural rights', and to institute sovereign central government: the 'Leviathan' for which the book is named. In general terms, a 'social contract' is the imaginary device by which individuals living without government or any form of alliance, come together to form a society and accept some form of obligation to one another, and thereafter binding themselves to a political sovereign whose purpose is to enforce those obligations. In this essay I am going to attempt to clarify what Hobbes' argument for the social contract entails, and examine why it is fundamentally flawed.
The concept of humankind in its natural state is fundamental to an understanding of how social contracts operate. According to Hobbes' theory, without society, we would live in a 'state of nature', where each individual has unlimited freedoms, or 'Rights of Nature'. He argues that whilst some individuals are more intelligent or stronger than others, nobody is so elevated in ability to be without fear of violent death. Hobbes holds that it is self-defence against such an attack is the highest human necessity, and the ultimate goal of reason. Rights are borne of necessity, and within the state of nature all people have the right to everything and anything there is – and because of this there will be a constant rights-based war of all against all. Hobbes calls life in the state of nature 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short'.
The final cause, end, or design of men (who naturally love liberty, and dominion over others) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, in which we see them live in Commonwealths, is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war which is necessarily consequent, as hath been shown, to the natural passions of men when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants...
(Book II, Ch. 17)
Hobbes states that in order to gain lasting self-preservation, the goal of reason, a stable society must be created, and all individuals within that society are required then to relinquish their Right of Nature, and thus enter into a social contract with one another. For example, an individual would cede their right to kill any other individual, provided that every other individual also ceded their right to kill. People agreeing to the contract retain only those rights over others which they are content to allow everybody else to retain over themselves – so in return for being granted freedom of speech, each person must also accept that all other people would be granted freedom of speech also.
However, due to humanity's natural desire for power, the social contract will always be under threat, and a central, sovereign authority must be established in order to force people to uphold it. Such a sovereign would be authorised by the contracted individuals, as part of the contract, possessing the individual powers and wills of all, and sanctioned to judge and punish and person who breaks the contract. Because there is fear of punishment, the presence of the sovereign reinforces the mandates of the laws of nature, hence ensuring the continued operation of the social contract. Hobbes calls this arrangement the 'commonwealth'.
Hobbes accords the sovereign (who may be one person or a number of people, although Hobbes always refers to the sovereign as 'he') twelve rights, covering the sovereign's executive, legislative and judicial rights. It is the strength of this autocratic government, Hobbes argues, that guarantees the continuance of the social contract, and thus protection from the state of nature.
Hobbes' concept of the state of nature, in which 'the notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice... have no place' (Leviathan, Ch. 15), is central to his argument for the social contract. He asserts that, because humanity is naturally inclined to this violent, lawless condition, the social contract must be upheld by aggressive enforcement. It is notable that, amongst social contract theorists, the more chaotic the state of nature is, the greater the advocacy of dictatorial rule. Other theorists have criticised Hobbes' view, arguing that he is fundamentally wrong in his view of human nature.
Fir example, in the eighteenth century, Rousseau claimed that Hobbes' argument was flawed because he had merely taken socialised individuals and imagined them living without government. Instead, Rousseau suggested that man was instead a 'noble beast', i.e. Without the fetters of civilization, humans are fundamentally good: 'Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the author of things; everything degenerates in the hands of man' (Emile: Or, On Education, 1762). Rousseau argues that the negative influence of society upon humanity is the transformation of amour de soi (self-respect), which is the innate and rational human desire for self-preservation, into amour-propre (pride), which is unnatural and compels humans to compare themselves to others, forming social hierarchies and creating baseless fear, allowing epicaricacy to flourish.
Rousseau's concept of the social contract differed to that of Hobbes, as under Rousseau, it came about through a natural desire to cooperate:
[The social contract] can be reduced to the following terms. Each of us puts his person and and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole
(Rousseau, Oeuvres complètes)
By uniting through the social contract, claims Rousseau, and abandoning their claim of natural rights, individuals can both maintain self-preservation and remain free – by submitting themselves to the general will of the populace as a whole, it is guaranteed that no individuals may be subordinated to the wills of others, and also ensures conformity with the law, as they are collectively its author.
Locke also opposed Hobbes' ideas. Locke believed that human nature is characterised by reason and tolerance, and that in a natural state all people were equal and independent, and governed by a certain form of law themselves – he held that whilst the state of nature was pre-political, it was not pre-moral:
The state of nature has a law to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or posessions.
(Two Treatises of Government, 1689)
He argues that the state of nature was a condition of perfect freedom, in which humanity does whatever is within their desire and ability to achieve, where each individual would have the liberty to live in a manner of their own choosing. Locke believed that the state of nature would be, comparison with Hobbes' conception, relatively peaceful, as it would be irrational for humans to risk their lives in a state of constant war.
For Locke, therefore, the state of nature is not the same as the state of war, however it can degenerate into this. Within the state of nature, Locke argues, individuals recognize the Law of Nature and thus do not harm one another, but war can arise due to disputes between individuals where property is stolen, or if one individual attempts to dominate another and make him his slave. Without government, there is no civil power to whom individuals can appeal to prevent such disputes, and as the Law of Nature allows them to defend their own lives, people may then kill those who attack them – and without any form of civil authority, once a state of war arises it may continue indefinitely. As all individuals are subject to this possibility, some form of government must be established.
Property is the essence of Locke's argument – he claims that an individual may only own what he can take from the land and use himself (thus leaving enough for every other individual), and it is out of a desire to protect this property, including their own bodies, which causes people to abandon the state of nature.
Both Hobbes and Rousseau's arguments are flawed, however: both rely upon an oversimplified account of human nature in order to justify the existence of a social contract. Each assumes a fundamental equality of self – that individuals share the same goals and ideals, regardless of situation. Whilst both have differing ideas about human nature, all people within the state of nature are taken from the same basic mould – whether that be as constantly warring, or as 'noble beasts'. Rousseau's suggestion seems fanciful and romanticised; his concept of the unfettered human as more legitimately noble and worthy than the contemporary product of civilised training can perhaps be viewed as a sympathetic attempt to increase the value of indigenous lifestyles and reject imperial excesses – establishing non-western humans as morally superior, in order to counter their perceived political and economic inferiorities.
Hobbes' idea seems to far to the other extreme. His arguments appear to be in reaction to the English Civil War – a concern over the right of the subject to overthrow and execute the monarch is clearly evident in his work, and much of Leviathan is occupied with demonstrating the necessity of centralised sovereign power to avoid the evils of animosity and civil war. Given this, it is possible that Hobbes deliberately portrayed uncivilised humanity in a severe light, partly to serve as a warning, and also due to what he witnessed of human nature during the war years.
Of the three, it is Locke's concept of humanity in its natural state which seems to hold most probable. Locke acknowledges the possibility of war, but also that humans out of civilisation can have compassion and some form of 'morality'. However, the purpose of this essay is not to evaluate differing opinions about what the state of nature is, but to criticize Hobbes' argument. As this is reliant almost wholly upon his idea of humanity in the state of nature, it was necessary to examine this also.
Hobbes' assertions can be criticized in a number of ways. Perhaps the most obvious is that if Hobbes is correct about the state of nature, then it would be impossible for any form of society to arise. Critics argue that it is logically fallacious to use a juristic and legal concept – i.e. That of a contract – to explain the establishment of legality and jurisdiction:
If the natural condition of mankind [is one] in which each individual is independent of any formal legal ties, how is it possible for men to perform such complex, apparently unified and obviously legal acts as consenting to the establishment of a sovereign, transferring their authority into his hands and and contracting to acknowledge the legitimacy of his laws?
(Skinner, 1978)
One of the problems in the state of nature, Hobbes argues, is that no individual can trust another, as any potential cooperation becomes a Prisoner's Dilemma – indeed, Hobbes asserts that one of the primary functions of the sovereign is to solve certain Prisoner's Dilemmas, as when legal sanctions are imposed by the sovereign, there is a clear best choice for all contractual partners:
Prisoner's Dilemma: * With legal sanctions:
Keep Renege * Keep Renege
Keep 2, 2 4,1 * Keep 1, 1 2, 3
Renege 1, 4 3, 3 * Renege 3, 2 3, 3
There is another, similar type of problem which would also involve the sovereign's intervention, which is known as the 'free rider' problem. This arises when some benefit may only be achieved collectively, but once it is produced all members will profit from it, either because it is impossible to exclude them, or it is too costly. For example, imagine that in a camp of five people, each must contribute some amount towards the defence of the camp. The reward for each individual's cooperation is great – much greater than the initial cost of production. Each member will benefit from the presence of defences, yet each also has an incentive not to pay:
Collective
Pay Not Pay
Individual
Pay 3, 3 1, 1
Not Pay 4, 2 2, 1
(Where figures in italics represent the preferences of the individual)
As can be seen from this matrix, the preferences of the individual are such that it is rational for them not to pay, regardless of the other's actions; and as each individual's preferences will be identical, it will be rational for any member of the camp not to pay the costs for defence. Of course, with the sovereign's influence, problems such as the above may be solved through coercive force or sanctions against not behaving cooperatively. It would seem from this that individuals would then welcome the presence of the sovereign, not merely because he has the authority to punish wrongdoers and solve Prisoner's Dilemmas, but also because he can discourage or prevent free riding in the production of collective benefits.
However, within the Hobbesian world, the institution of the sovereign itself becomes either a Prisoner's Dilemma or a collective good – and in the state of nature there is no pre-existing sanctions to enforce or solve such problems. So without a sovereign, no sovereign may be put in place, and thus no social contract will ever be successful. By his own hand is Hobbes' argument defeated. In her book, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, Hampton summarizes the problem nicely:
Hobbes' account of conflict seems to generate sufficient strife to make the institution of the sovereign necessary, but too much strife to make that institution possible.
(Ch. 6)
HOW DO I END THIS?